















Fertility, Parental Education and Development in India: New Evidence 




Katsushi S. Imai  
Economics, School of Social Sciences, University of Manchester, UK and Research Institute 
for Economics & Business Administration (RIEB), Kobe University, Japan 
& 
Takahiro Sato   




Corresponding Author:  
Dr. Katsushi. S. Imai 
Economics, School of Social Sciences, University of Manchester, Arthur Lewis Building, 
Oxford Road, Manchester M13 9PL, UK, Telephone:+44-(0)161-275-4827, Fax:+44-(0)161-
275-4812, Email: Katsushi.Imai@manchester.ac.uk  
 
Acknowledgements:   
We are grateful to the financial support of Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (S) 
(#21221010), the Australian Research Council-AusAID Linkage grant LP0775444 in 
Australia, and the small grant from DFID and Chronic Poverty Research Centre at the 
University of Manchester in the UK. Research support from RIEB, Kobe University for the 
first author is greatly acknowledged. We have benefited from valuable comments at various 
stages from Barrientos Armando, Sonia Bhalotra, Pranab Bardhan, Per Eklund, Raghav 
Gaiha, Raghbendra Jha, Kunal Sen, Shoji Nishijima and Yoshifumi Usami and participants 
in seminars at Harvard, Manchester, Bristol, Kobe, Osaka City and Doshisha Universities 
and the international conference on ‘New Directions in Welfare’ at St Catherine’s College, 
Oxford University, 29 June - 1 July 2009. The views expressed are, however, those of the 





Fertility, Parental Education and Development in India: New Evidence 




This paper empirically investigates the determinants of fertility drawing upon large 
household data sets in India, namely NSS and NFHS over the period 1992-2006. 
Broadly similar and consistent results are found for the two surveys for different years. 
We have found a negative and significant association between the number of children 
and mother’s education. Both direct and indirect effects are observed for mother’s 
education which not just directly reduces fertility but also increases mother’s 
potential wages or opportunity costs which would deter her from having a baby. 
Father’s education became increasingly important in reducing fertility in the last two 
rounds.  
 
Key Words: Fertility, Parental Education, NSS (National Sample Survey), NFHS (National 
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I.   Introduction  
The population problem is still one of the important global issues in the 21
st century in light 
of alleviating world poverty and guaranteeing food security. The population increase is also 
closely related to global warming simply because more people will consume more 
resources.
1 Based on the UN estimate, the world population is projected to reach 6.90 billion 
by the end of 2010 and 9.15 billion in 2050 (Table 1). More than one third of the current 
world population is concentrated in India and China: India's population is 1.21 billion, 
ranked second in the world after China with the population being 1.35 billion in 2010. 
                                                 
1 See Vallely (2008) for the recent debate.  3 
 
However, India is likely to be the most populous country in the world by 2050 with 1.61 
billion people; 17.6% of the world population, while China’s population will only reach 
$1.41 billion under certain assumptions on mortality and fertility changes (the United 
Nations, 2009). No doubt, curbing the population growth in Sub-Saharan African (SSA) 
countries will remain crucial in providing a solution for the global population problem as 
their population is expected to increase from 0.86 billion in 2010 to 1.75 billion in 2050. 
India’s population problem, however, would be equally important, at least in terms of its size. 
Besides, it could be controlled by the governmental policy of a single country, not many as in 
the SSA region.          
(Table 1 to be inserted)  
 
     The population problem is one of the crucial domestic issues for India as well because, for 
example, the fertility decline will have direct and indirect impacts on national poverty.
2 If the 
calculation of the poverty rate is based on per capita expenditure or income, the reduction in 
fertility will decrease it significantly. If the household has fewer children, then the access to 
education or health services for each child will be increased, which would improve the 
poverty situations indirectly. Economic growth is influenced by population growth and 
fertility changes, while the former would affect the latter in a complex way, for example, 
through technical changes (e.g. Rosenzweig, 1990).     
     Although India was among the first developing countries to implement family planning 
programs, authoritarian birth control measures corresponding to China’s ‘one child policy’ 
have never been included as a policy option except for a very short period during the mid 
1970's. While the population trend has been upwards since the last century, it is conjectured 
that India is now moving from the second stage to the third stage of the demographic 
                                                 
2 Poverty head count ratio based on the national poverty line in 2004/5 is 28.7% (Himanshu, 2007).    4 
 
transition. 
3 Indeed, the crude birth rate is 25 per thousand in 1999 compared to 43 in 1960, 
and the total fertility rate (TFR), the average number of children women bear over their 
lifetime, was 3 in 1999 as against 6 in 1960. Consequently, the annual growth rate of the 
population went down from 2.3% in 1960-1970 to 1.9% in 1990-1995 and further to 1.7% in 
1995-2000 (Mahbub ul Haq Human Development Center 2002).  Few studies, however, have 
examined the causes for this structural change using the household or individual survey data.  
     The main objective of the present study is thus to identify the determinants of decline in 
fertility rates in India drawing upon two different sources of multi-rounds of large national 
household survey data spanning from 1992 to 2006, namely National Sample Survey (NSS) 
Data in 1993-4, 1999-2000 and 2004-5 and National Family Health Survey (NFHS) Data in 
1992-3, 1998-9 and 2005-6. An individual household's fertility decision which underlies 
macro-level demographic transition can be directly analyzed by using the household data sets. 
Our main focus is on the role of parental education in reducing the fertility rates. The impacts 
of other household socioeconomic characteristics on fertility are also tested.     
     It is widely known that female education contributes to fertility reduction. For example, 
according to Subbarao and Raney (1995, p. 105),  
Female education increases the value of women's time in economic activities by raising labor 
productivity and wages, with a consequential rise in household incomes and a reduction in 
poverty. Female education also produces social gains by improving health (the women's own 
health and the health of her children), increasing child schooling, and reducing fertility.  
 
Drèze and Sen (2002, p.19) extended this line of argument:  
…women's emancipation (through basic education, economic independence, political 
organization and related means) tends to have quite a strong impact on fertility rates. This linkage 
has been widely observed in international comparisons, but it is consistent also with recent 
experiences of remarkably rapid fertility reduction…. Through this connection with demographic 
                                                 
3 The theory of demographic transition explains the common pattern of transition in population 
history. While the first stage of transition before economic modernisation sees stable population due 
to high birth and death rates, the population grows rapidly in the second stage where death rates 
decline more rapidly than birth rates, for example, through better educational systems and medical 
and health care facilities only available in modernised society. The population becomes stable again 
in the third stage when further modernisation and better education cause fertility to go down.   
 5 
 
change, the role of women's agency extends well beyond the interest of today's women, and even 
beyond the interests of all living people today, and has a significant impact on the lives of future 
generation.  
 
     The form of the data (e.g. cross section or panel data) or their level of aggregation (e.g. 
national, state, district, or household level) varies considerably among different studies to 
draw these conclusions. Along the lines of Subbarao and Raney (1995), Drèze and Murthi 
(2001) empirically found that female education is the most important determinant of fertility, 
using the district-level data, the data which aggregate the census data at district levels in 
India. However, few studies have examined the determinants of fertility using household 
level data despite the fact that fertility decision is actually made at individual or household 
levels. Drèze and Murthi (2001: 40) recognize the utility of employing household-level data 
as follows: “…if fertility decisions are, in fact, driven mainly by individual and household 
characteristics (with social effects playing little role), then household-level analyses are more 
appropriate, bearing in mind the potential aggregation problems involved in treating the 
district as the unit of analysis.”
4 
     While we examine the direct effect of education on fertility by including variables on 
education as explanatory variables in the fertility equation, the indirect effect of parental 
education through the change in opportunity costs of parents is also tested by including 
predicted parental wages which are also estimated by education. This is an extension of 
Foster and Rosenzweig (2006) who analyzed the fertility decline in India using panel data by 
incorporating predicted wages into the fertility equation.
5 One would also claim that 
                                                 
4 There is a huge theoretical literature on household fertility decision (e.g. Becker 1960, Becker and 
Lewis, 1973, Bardhan and Udry 1999, Browning and Chiappori 1998). For example, Bardhan and 
Udry (1999) applied the ‘collective’ model of household behavior that explicitly models intra-
household resource allocation and showed that the increase in women’s opportunity cost of raising 
children would reduce the number of children.  
5 Drawing upon the household panel data sets in India over the period 1971-1999, Foster and 
Rosenzweig find evidence on the importance of changes in the implicit cost or shadow price of 
children and women as sources of fertility change. The main departure of our study is that we use the 
individual education in estimating male and female wage equations based on much larger nationwide 6 
 
education is not exogenous determinants of fertility. Another contribution would be made by 
estimating the instrumental variable (IV) model where parental education is instrumented by 
the availability of village-level education in grandparent’s age.       
     The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The data we use in this paper are described 
with their basic statistical analysis in Section II. After the presentation of econometric 
models in Section III, we report and discuss the regression results in Section IV. The final 
section offers concluding remarks with some policy implications.  
 
II.   Data  
This study draws upon three rounds of employment schedule of National Sample Survey 
(NSS) Data in 1993-4, 1999-2000 and 2004-5 (or 50
th, 55
th and 61
st round) and National 
Family Health Survey (NFHS) Data in 1992-3, 1998-9 and 2005-6 (or NFHS-1, NFHS-2 and 
NFHS-3). There are two reason for using both NSS and NFHS. First, detailed data on 
fertility behavior are available only in NFHS, while we could construct only the proxy for 
fertility, namely the number of children in the household from NSS. Potentially important 
determinants of fertility, such as parental wages or household expenditures, are only 
available from NSS. Second, comparing the results based on the same econometric model 
applied to these two different survey data would not only make our conclusion more robust 
but also provide additional insights into fertility behavior in India.  
     The NSS, set up by the Government of India in 1950, is a multi-subject integrated sample 
survey conducted all over the India level in the form of successive rounds relating to various 
aspects of social, economic, demographic, industrial and agricultural statistics.
6 We use the 
data in the ‘Employment and Unemployment’ schedule, called ‘the scheduled 10’, one of the 
                                                                                                                                                       
household data sets, while Foster and Rosenzweig use village-level education, which is not 
significant.   
6 See the website of National Sample Survey Organisation http://mospi.nic.in/nsso_test1.htm for more 
details of NSS.  7 
 
series of quinquennial surveys in 1993-4, 1999-2000 and 2004-5. These form the repeated 
cross-section data sets, each of which contains a large number of households across India.
7 
The employment and unemployment schedule contains a variety of information related to 
employment and unemployment situations together with basic socio economic characteristics 
of the household (e.g. sex, age, religion, caste, and land-holding) and mean per capita 
expenditure (MPCE).  The comparison across different years is possible only at the 
aggregated regional unit, such as state or NSS region.  
      The NFHS is another major nationwide, large multi-round survey conducted in a 
representative sample of households in India with focus on health and nutrition of household 
members, especially of women and young children.
8 The survey also contains the detailed 
data on fertility and mortality. The years for the three rounds of NFHS roughly correspond to 
those for NSS, which enables us to compare NSS and NFHS for each round.    
     The dependent variable constructed by NSS is the number of children who are aged under 
15 years old and deemed children of the head of the households or his or her spouse (to 
exclude the grandchildren of the head or maid in a large household). Mother, on the other 
hand, is defined as a female member of the household aged from 13 to 60 years old who is 
either the household head’s spouse or the household head herself (including the case of 
single mothers) assuming that a woman could give a birth in the age from 13 to 45.
9 We use 
these indirect ways of identifying children and mothers, as NSS does not have the data by 
                                                 
7 After dropping the households with missing observations in one of the explanatory variables, the 




st round.  
8 See http://www.nfhsindia.org/index.html for the detailed description of NFHS.  
9 The problem with this procedure, which is inevitable for NSS, is that a representative mother is not 
necessarily a true mother as she could also be the grandmother in case of extended families. The same 
problem applies to representative fathers. However, we have confirmed based on NSS 55
th round data 
that the percentage of representative parents not necessarily being true for children is less than 10%. 
The use of NFHS will overcome this limitation.      8 
 
which we track a mother for each child. Our proxy for fertility based on NSS thus excludes 
children who died.   
     A more direct proxy for the fertility is available from NFHS, which would overcome the 
above limitation. NFHS has a question to ask mothers aged 15- 49 years old on how many 
children they have borne, after excluding any miscarriage but including any death of children. 
We used the number of children based on this question as a dependent variable. While NFHS 
has an ideal proxy for fertility, it lacks the data of household expenditure, father or mother’s 
wages which are potentially important determinants of fertility and found in only NSS. The 
joint use of NSS and NFHS is thus necessary because of these limitations.           
     Table 2 summarizes the recent trend of total fertility rate (TFR)
10 by region in India. 
Overall, TFR declined from 1992 to 2005 across different areas and regions in India. 
However, there remains a significant disparity between rural and urban areas. Also noted is a 
disparity among different regions, reflecting disparity among different states. TFRs are much 
lower in South (Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu) and West (Goa, 
Gujarat and Maharashtra) than in Central (Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh), East (Bihar, 
Orissa and West Bengal) or Northeast (Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, 
Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim and Tripura). North is roughly at the national average, while 
TFR is varied within North raging from 1.94 in Himachal Pradesh and 1.99 in Punjab to 3.21 
in Rajasthan in 2005.        




                                                 
10 TFR is the average number of children that would be born to a woman over her lifetime if she were 
to experience the exact current age-specific fertility rates through her lifetime, and she were to 
survive from birth through the end of her reproductive life.  9 
 
III.  Econometric Models 
The main objective of our econometric models is to identify the key determinants of fertility 
proxied by the number of children. The basic idea of specifying the econometric model of 
fertility behavior draws upon Drèze and Sen (2001) and Foster and Rosenzweig (2006).  
 
(1) Tobit Model   
Using the cross sectional household data constructed by three rounds of NSS and NFHS, we 
estimate the following reduced form as a baseline model. In this version we do not insert 
wages of father or mother, assuming that the coefficients related to parental education 
capture both direct and indirect effects.   
                                              (1) 
11 
 denotes household and the dependent variable is   the number of children defined 
separately for NSS and NFHS as discussed in the previous section.   is estimated by the 
following explanatory variables. 
  : A vector of the mother’s education (Case (1): whether literate; Case (3): whether 
literate, but has not completed primary school, whether completed primary school, whether 
completed middle school, whether completed secondary or higher secondary school, and 
whether completed higher education). Each dummy variable takes either 1 or 0.   
     In general, female education may be considered as a proxy for the opportunity cost of 
raising children. Furthermore, an increase in female education will empower women and 
increase their bargaining capability in households, which results in a decline in the number of 
children born, and thus avoids the physical risks of childbirth for mothers, or improves health 
and education of children.  
                                                 
11 There is a high correlation between neo-natal mortality and fertility as a mother who has lost her 
baby is more likely to have another baby, analytically and empirically shown by Bhalotra and van 
Soest (2008) in the Indian context. In case where we use NSS, we may underestimate the fertility as 
our proxy of fertility excludes children who died. They are counted in case of NFHS.      10 
 
: A vector of the father’s education (defined same as above).  
Higher level of the father’s education might lead him to cooperate with mother in developing 
the family plan and using contraceptives. This has been relatively neglected in the literature 
with a few exceptions, for example, Bhat (2002). 
: Household income (proxied by mean per capita expenditure or MPCE at household 
level).
12     
: Mother’s age and its square, which take account of the life cycle effect of mother.   
: Social backwardness of the household in terms of (i) whether a household belongs to 
scheduled caste and (ii) whether it belongs to scheduled tribe.  
: Occupation of parents in terms of (i) whether the household is classified as non-
agricultural self-employment and (ii) whether as agricultural self-employment.  
 Religion of the household. We use the Muslim dummy only in consideration of the 
unique fertility behavior among Muslims.  
: Owned land as a measure of wealth.   
: Son-preference index (defined as [the number of female children]/[the total number of 
children]) following Arnold, Choe, and Roy (1998) and Drèze and Murthi (2001). In India, 
the fact that sons are preferred over daughters is well known and thus the expected sign of 
this index is positive.
 13       
R:  The degree of urbanisation proxied by the rural sector dummy (whether in rural areas).    
: A vector of state dummy variables.  
                                                 
12 One of the fundamental factors underling income growth is technical change. See Rosenzweig 
(1990) who showed analytically and empirically that changes in returns to exogenous technical 
change induce human capital investments and reduce fertility.   
13 Two other interpretations can be made of this index. First, it reflects higher expected wages of sons 
and higher expected expenses related to daughters (e.g. dowry), leading to higher expected household 
net income in the future by having more sons. Second, the index may be correlated with the 
opportunity cost of raising children, since young girls, whose opportunity costs are negligible, are 
usually involved in raising younger brothers and sisters. 11 
 
     Tobit model is used to take account of censoring at 0 as some households do not have any 
children.
14  
                                        (2)  
 
 
where   is the latent variable, whose actual value we cannot directly observe from 
the data set.   is a vector of a set of explanatory variables, such as mother’s education, Ei
m 
or Land,  L, while  is a corresponding vector of coefficient.   is an error term.  
     Tobit has the advantage of providing an unbiased and consistent estimator when the 
variance of the error term is homoscedastic, while the OLS estimator given in the first model 
is still biased and inconsistent. However, the Tobit estimator is neither unbiased nor 
consistent and the estimator is unreliable when the variance of the error term is 
heteroscedastic, while heteroscedasticity plays no role in the determination of the 
unbiasedness in the case of OLS. We have thus employed Tobit model based on the White-
Huber robust variance-covariance estimator. 
 
(2)   IV Estimation 
Education is deemed not exogenous due to the simultaneity in determining the number of 
children, the dependent variable, and the general level of education at household level. This 
will cause the correlation of education and the error term, which may bias the coefficient 
estimate. We use two stage least squares (2SLS) to address this issue in estimating the 
fertility equation. For example, if a household has fewer or no children, then young parents 
or couples could have time to go to school. A household with fewer children could spend 
                                                 
14 We have tried both OLS and Tobit for all the cases and obtained broadly similar results. Due to the 
space limitation, we report the results based on Tobit.  12 
 
more in their education per child and in the next generation, they will have fewer children 
when they are grown up. IV (instrumental variable) estimation would at least partly take 
account of this problem. However, it is not generally easy to find the variable which affects 
parental education, but not the dependent variable, the number of their children. For NSS, we 
use the ratio of those who attended primary school in the total in the age group 50 or above 
for men and women separately at the village level (or the FSU (first sampling unit) village 
level). For NFHS, the ratios are constructed in the same way except that they are based on 
the secondary school attendance. This are proxies for general education levels or the 
availability of primary or secondary education for grandparents, which would affect parental 
education, but not fertility.
15  
 
(3)  Incorporation of Wage Equation into the Fertility Model   
While the higher level of parental education is likely to reduce fertility, it is not clear whether 
it is due to the increase in bargaining power or in opportunity costs for a mother. Educated 
women are more likely to earn higher wages and have a less incentive to have children. As 
NSS provides us with individual data of earnings during the previous week of the survey date, 
these could be used as proxies for wages of mothers and fathers. So in the first step, we 
estimate the parental wage equation by Tobit model. 
                                  (3) 
                                              (3)’  
Here wage for female workers (or for male workers) is estimated by a set of variables at 
individual levels for the individual j, such as a set of education dummies,  , age or its square, 
                                                 
15 One may criticise the validity of this instrument for various grounds. For example, many women in 
India marry men outside the village. However, because of the data limitation which does not allow us 
to construct better instruments, we use the lagged education at village or community levels as an 
instrument. The results will have to be interpreted with caution.     13 
 
denoted as a vector,  . These variables serve as identifying wage equations. Reflecting the 
difference in the labour market structure for rural and urban areas, the wage equation is 
estimated for rural and urban areas separately, and separately for   and  .  This 
will give us predicted wages for female and male workers (including fathers and mothers),  
 and  , which will be directly used as predicted wages for mother and father for 
each household  ,   and  . These predicted wages will be used as explanatory variables 
for the estimation of fertility together with the variables at household level, such as   
and   in the second step.  
                                               
                                                                                                                                  (4) 
The equation (4) will enable us to identify the direct and indirect effects of education of 
parents on fertility, the latter of which will be related to the effects of education on wages. 
This is an extension of Foster and Rosenzweig (2006) by taking account of the effects of 
individual education on wages.   
          
IV.  Main Results 
In this section we will report and discuss econometric results for the models described in the 
previous section. The results of cross-sectional estimations for the first, second and third 
rounds of NSS and NFHS are compared in Tables 3, 4, and 5. The results for wage equations 
are shown in Appendix 1. Selected state-wise regression results are found in Appendix 2. 





(1)   Cross-sectional Regression Results for Households across all India   
For each round of NSS and NFHS, we show six cases, four for NSS and three for NFHS in 
Tables 3, 4, and 5. In Case (1) for NSS and for NFHS, we estimate the equation (1) using the 
literacy dummies for mother and father by Tobit model. In Case (2), 2SLS is applied to take 
account of the endogeneity of education variables for mother and father (or their literacy) 
which are instrumented by the pre-generation access to primary school at the village level. In 
Case (3) for NSS, predicted wages of mother and father are used for Tobit model where 
dummy variables of mother and father’s educational levels are used. The corresponding case 
for NFHS is Case (3) which uses similar education dummies without wages because wage 
data are not available from NFHS.           
       (Tables 3, 4 and 5 to be inserted) 
 
     Although NSS and NFHS are carried out for different purposes and the dependent 
variables are defined differently as we discussed in the previous section, we find very similar 
patterns of the results for the two surveys. This is important in two ways. First, this will 
justify our use of proxy for fertility constructed by NSS, or child number.
16 Second, the 
robustness of our general conclusions is strengthened as a set of the results based on one 
survey serves as sensitivity tests for the other.  
     All the cases for three rounds show that the coefficient estimate of age is positive and 
significant and its square is negative and significant except a few cases (e.g. Case (1) of 
Table 5 where age is not significant). This reflects the non-linearity in the age-fertility 
relationship, i.e., the fertility rate first increases and then falls as the mother's age increases, 
which is consistent with the life cycle of a typical household. 
                                                 
16 The dependent variable for NSS (the number of children under 15 of the household head and 
spouse) and that for NFHS (the number of children a mother bears) aggregated at state level and 
disaggregated for rural and urban areas are positively correlated with relatively high correlation 
coefficients, 0.74, 0.80, and 0.75 for three rounds.     15 
 
     The non-agricultural self-employment dummies have a significant and positive sign in 
most of the cases. These results suggest that children work for household enterprises as 
family laborers, more so than in other types of households. The coefficients of the 
agricultural self-employment household dummy are also positive and significant in most of 
the cases. The results suggest that children, as agricultural labor input, are more valuable in 
agricultural households than in other types of households. 
     The coefficients of scheduled caste dummies are positive and significant in most of the 
cases for NSS and NFHS, whilst the results on scheduled tribe dummies are more mixed. It 
appears that the negative coefficients in the first round (significant in Cases (1) and (2)) 
turned into positive in the last round in a few cases. Drèze and Sen (2002) and Murthi, Guio, 
and Drèze (1995) found a negative coefficient on the scheduled tribes variable, while Drèze 
and Murthi (2001) found no relation between the scheduled tribes variable and fertility after 
controlling son-preference index. Maharatna (2000) finds a relatively low fertility rate in 
tribal communities by investigating historical material in British colonial India. Our results 
suggest that after controlling son-preference index the fertility level of tribal communities 
was relatively lower than the rest in the early 1990s, but it became relatively higher in 2004-6. 
The positive effect of scheduled caste and Muslim dummies on fertility found in all the cases 
is consistent with the earlier literature, for example, Mouhasha and Rama Rao (1999) and 
Bhat and Zavier (2005).
17 
18  
     The coefficient estimates of MPCE, our proxy for household income, which is available 
only for NSS, are negative and significant in Cases (1) and (2) for NSS in Tables 3, 4, and 5. 
                                                 
17 Note that we excluded Muslim households with more than one female spouse of a male household 
head.    
18 However, it should be noted that fertility declined among Hindus as well as Muslims in India as 
suggested, for example, by James and Nair (2005) and Kulkarni and Alagrajan (2005). We do not 
investigate this issue directly, but the results of state-wise fertility regressions show that Muslim 
dummy ceased to be significant in 2004-5 in a few states, such as Tamil Nadu, West Bengal, and 
Bihar, which suggests some recent changes in reproductive behavior among Indian Muslims.   16 
 
Regarding the estimates of owned land, they are mostly negative and significant for NSS 
whereby it is defined as all the land possessed by the household. The signs are expected. 
However, due to the data limitation, NFHS has the variable of the area of agricultural land 
(which may be larger for rural households –which tend to have more children in a household 
in general- but some rich agricultural households may have fewer children) and thus we get 
mixed results. In 1992 and 1998, the effects of agricultural lands on fertility were by and 
large negative and significant as expected by theory, but they became positive in 2005. While 
the economic growth will contribute to a lower fertility rate as implied by the theory of 
demographic transition, this is not clearly supported by the micro-level household data.  
     The son preference index is significantly positive in all equations irrespective of the 
model specification. This result confirms that son preference increases fertility, as observed 
by Drèze and Murthi (2001).  
     Let us turn to the effects of education on fertility. Tables 3, 4 and 5 confirm that mother’s 
education is negative and significant irrespective of the specifications (e.g. whether education 
is instrumented or not; literacy dummy or dummies on educational levels are used) over the 
period of 1992-2006 for both NSS and NFHS. The role of father’s education appears to have 
changed over time from positive and significant (or non-significant) effects in 1992-4 to 
negative and significant effects in 1998-2000 to 2004-2006 for NSS and NFHS with a few 
exceptions. This implies that the role of father’s education in reducing fertility became 
increasingly important over the years.  
     For example, in Case (1) for NSS and for NFHS in Tables 3, 4 and 5, we used the dummy 
variables on mother and father’s literacy in the baseline specification without instrumenting 
them. In all the cases, mother’s literacy dummy is negative and significant, while father’s 
literacy dummy is negative and significant in Case (1) for NFHS-2 and 3 and Case (1) for the 
NSS 61
st round. Negative and significant results for mother’s literacy dummy are unchanged 17 
 
in Case (2) for NSS and Case (2) for NFHS where dummy variables for mother and father’s 
education are instrumented by pre-generation access to primary school for males and females 
using 2SLS.
19 On the estimate of father’s literacy dummy, it is negative and non-significant 
in 1993-4 and becomes negative and significant in 1999-2000 and in 2004-5 for NSS. 
However, it is positive for three rounds of NFHS.  
      In Case (3) for NSS and for NFHS, the predicted wages for father and mother as well as 
the dummy variables on their educational attainment are used to estimate fertility. Wages are 
predicted by the wage equations for males and females at individual levels for rural and 
urban areas separately as shown in Appendix 1. Appendix 1 shows that education level 
dummies (for which the baseline case is ‘illiterate’) are all positive and significant and the 
significance level is higher with higher levels of education in Tobit estimations. Predicted 
wages of mothers, defined for both the actual labor market participants and non-participants 
(the latter of which implied wages are derived by the individual characteristics) are negative 
and significant for all three rounds of NSS. This implies that higher wages would decrease 
the fertility through higher opportunity costs (Case (3) in Tables 3, 4, and 5). The negative 
and significant results are unchanged for all three rounds if actual wages are used only for 
households with small samples of labor market participants.
20 The predicted wages of father 
are negative and significant in 1993-4, positive and significant in 1999-2000 and 2004-5. It is 
important to note in these cases that the coefficient estimates of education-level dummies in 
fertility equations are negative and significant for mother throughout all three rounds. Those 
of father are positive in the first round and negative and significant in the second and the 
                                                 
19 The IV regression results are validated in all cases because coefficient estimates of the instruments 
are statistically significant in the first stage. Due to the space limitation, we report only the coefficient 
estimates and t-statistics of instruments in the first stage at the bottom of Tables 3, 4 and 5. Hausman 
test rejects the null hypothesis that difference of coefficient estimates of IV regression and those of 
OLS is systematic for NSS 50
th and 55
th rounds and NFHS-3, in which the choice of IV is justified. 
The hypothesis is not rejected in other cases.   
20 The results will be furnished on request.  18 
 
third rounds. It can be concluded that mother’ education has direct and indirect negative 
effects on fertility. Father’s education has either direct (in 1999-2000 or 2004-5) or indirect 
(in 1993-4) negative effects on fertility.   
     Our result, therefore, justifies the greater role of female education in fertility reduction as 
emphasized by earlier studies, for example, Brookins and Brookins (2002), Drèze and Sen 
(2002), Drèze and Murthi (2001), Subbarao and Raney (1985), and Jain and Nag (1986).
21 
While Drèze and Murthi (2001) and Drèze and Sen (2002) claim that male literacy makes no 
contribution to reduction in fertility when controlled by female education, our study confirms 
that both male literacy and education attainments are closely associated with fertility 
reduction particularly in more recent years.  
     These differences from the earlier studies are related to our contributions made by taking 
account of heterogeneity within districts and the extensive use of survey data covering more 
recent periods. The robustness of our results is further strengthened by using IV to take 
account of the endogeneity of education.   
 
(2)   State-wise Results   
Appendix 2 provides cross-sectional regressions applied to household-level data constructed 
from NSS for selected states. Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu experienced remarkable 
reduction of TFR from 1992-3 to 2005-6, 2.59 to 1.79 and 2.48 to 1.80 respectively. Kerala 
is the state of which the fertility rate was already low (2.00) in 1992-3 and experienced the 
small degree of reduction to 1.93 in 2005-6. West Bengal and Orissa experienced the similar 
decline in TFR from 2.92 to 2.27 or 2.37 in the same period. Bihar remained one of the states 
                                                 
21 We are not excluding the possibility that the fertility among illiterate parents have recently declined 
in India as argued by Bhat (2002). It must be noted, however, that fertility declined among illiterate 
parents, but more so among educated parents, implying the importance of parental education. For 
example, if we estimate the pseudo panel for the first difference of the number of children, education 
dummies are negative and significant in some cases. The results will be furnished on request.         19 
 
with the highest TFR in India (from 4.00 to 3.83). The specification same as Case (3) in 
Tables 3, 4, and 5 is used.         
         Four observations are made to summarize the results on key variables, land, wage and 
parental education. First, land is negative and significant in all the states. Second, in the 
states which experienced the remarkable decline in TFR (e.g. Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, 
West Bengal and Orissa), (i) mother’s education is generally important and the negative and 
significant effects of mother’s educational attainment, particularly at middle school, 
secondary school and higher education became increasingly pronounced in 1999-2000 and 
2004-5, (ii) father’s education became important in the last two or in the last survey, reflected 
in the negative and significant coefficient estimates, and (iii) mother’s wage is negative and 
significant, while father’s wage is positive in the last round. Third, in Kerala education 
attainments at higher levels are not significant and mother’s wage is not significant either, in 
contrast with results for Andhra Pradesh or Tamil Nadu. This may be because Kerala had 
already reached the stage where the relative importance of higher levels of education or 
higher mother’s wage was low. Finally, even in Bihar with high TFR, mother’s wage is 
negative and significant and mother’s educational attainments as well as higher education of 
father are associated with lower fertility in 2004-5.        
       
V. Concluding Observations 
This paper examines the determinants of fertility drawing upon three rounds of NSS and 
NFHS data over the period 1992-2006. That fertility declined dramatically in many parts of 
India during the period is consistent with the view that India is seen to be moving through the 
second stage toward the third stage of demographic transition. The investigation of fertility in 
India is important not only for providing an insight into the population problem for the 20 
 
second populous country in the world. It also serves as a background for the debate on 
poverty in India which would be influenced by the geographical pattern of population growth.        
     This paper sheds an empirical light on the determinants of fertility by applying several 
econometric models (namely Tobit, IV for parental education, and the two step estimation 
where parental wages are estimated in the first stage and fertility is estimated by Tobit) to the 
large household data sets constructed by NSS and NFHS. Finally, state-wise regressions are 
estimated for selected states. One of the important contributions of the present study is made 
by our finding of broadly similar and consistent results for the two different surveys, NSS 
and NFHS, which have been used separately in the empirical literature. Besides, the results 
are not much different across different years and for different models. Our main findings are 
summarized below.  
     First, consistent with the literature, mother’s education is related to reduction in fertility. 
We have confirmed by Tobit model a negative and significant association of the number of 
children (the number of children under 15 in a household who are deemed children of 
household heads or spouse for NSS and the number of children a mother bears for NFHS) 
and mother’s education. This negative and significant relationship is unchanged over the 
different years (i) when mother’s literacy is instrumented by pre-generation access to primary 
education of mother and (ii) when parental wages estimated by individual education are 
inserted.  
     Second, we have found significant and negative estimates for father’s education, 
particularly relatively higher levels of education in the second round in 1998-2000 and the 
third round in 2004-6 of NSS and NFHS. Third, the significant negative relation between 
fertility and mean per capita expenditure at household level is observed, while owned land is 
negative and significant in the cases where NSS is used. Finally, some diversity is observed 
on the determinants of fertility in different states.  21 
 
      Our results suggest that policies of national and state governments to support social 
infrastructure, such as school at various levels and to promote both male and female 
education, together with facilitating female labor market participations, would be very 
important to reduce fertility and to speed down the population growth. These policies would 
play particularly important roles in backward states or for socially disadvantaged groups (e.g. 
Scheduled Castes) which have higher fertility as well as poverty rates.         
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Table 1 Population Projection for India, China, Sub-Saharan Africa and World in 2005 
 India  China  SSA
*2. World 
1980 693 981 390  4438 
  (15.6%) (22.1%) (8.8%)  (100%) 
2010 1214  1354 863  6909 
  (17.6%) (19.6%) (12.5%) (100%) 
 
2050  1614 1417 1753  9150 
  (17.6%) (15.5%) (19.2%) (100%) 
*1. Unit: million. The number in the brackets: share in the world. 
*2. Sub-Saharan Countries total.  




Table 2 Total Fertility Rate for 15-49 in India based on NFHS-1, 2 and 3 (1992-3, 1998-9 and 
2005-6) 
 URBAN    RURAL  Total 
   1992  1998 2005     1992 1998 2005   1992 1998 2005 
North 2.69  2.15 1.95    3.60 2.98 2.68 3.32  2.71  2.43 
Central 3.43 2.75 2.66    4.65 3.94 3.64 4.36 3.65 3.37 
East 2.64  2.21 2.04    3.46 2.86 3.04 3.28  2.75  2.82 
Northeast 2.53  2.08 2.09  2.70 3.43 3.17 3.31  3.12  2.87 
West 2.33  2.09 1.87    2.76 2.53 2.31 2.58  2.34  2.11 
South 2.22  1.90 1.76      2.60 2.22 1.99   2.48 2.13 1.90 
All India  2.70  2.27 2.06     3.67 3.07 2.98   3.39  2.85  2.68 



























Table 3 Determinants of Fertility (based on NSS 50
th round in 1993/4 and NFHS-1 in 1992/3) 
Dependent Variable: Number of Children 
    Based on NSS 50 (1993/4)  Based on NFHS-1 (1992/3) 
    Case (1)  Case (2)  Case (3)  Case (1)  Case (2)  Case (3)
 
 












    Coef.   Coef.   Coef.   Coef.   Coef.   Coef.  
  
 Explanatory Variables 
(t value)  (t value)  (t value)  (t value)  (t value)  (t value) 
  Mother`s Age  0.494  0.216  0.589  0.307 0.15 0.316 
    (89.38)** (62.86)**  (91.99)**  (20.20)** (10.77)** (20.76)**
  (Mother`s Age)
2  -0.008  -0.003  -0.009  -0.002 0.00 -0.002 
    (96.13)** (63.28)**  (95.72)**  (7.06)** (0.17) (7.77)**
 
Scheduled Tribe (ST) dummy (ST=1, 
otherwise=0)  -0.077  -0.137  0.007 -0.084 -0.089 -0.091 
    (3.35)**  (5.80)**  (0.29)  (1.30) (0.64) (1.40) 
 
Scheduled Caste (SC) dummy 
(SC=1, otherwise=0)  0.038  -0.054  0.035  0.263 0.164 0.235 
    (2.15)*  (3.05)**  (1.83) (4.17)** (2.10)* (3.72)**
 
non-agricultural self employment 
dummy (non-agricultural self 
employment=1 otherwise) 
0.186 0.156  0.352  0.147  0.055  -0.008 
    (12.39)** (13.21)**  (13.41)**  (2.75)**  (0.70)  (0.15) 
 
agricultural self employment dummy 
(agricultural self employment=1 
otherwise=0) 
0.214  0.124  0.287  0.199 0.077 0.029 
    (8.61)** (6.57)**  (9.43)**  (3.65)**  (0.55)  (0.50) 
 
monthly per capita expenditure 
(MPCE) (Rs.) (/10
6)  -13.20 -2.80  -  - - - 
    (21.58)** (2.86)** -  - - - 
  Land Owned  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 0.00 -0.001 
    (1.49)  (1.64)  (1.33)  (2.44)* (0.95) (2.24)* 
 
Muslim dummy(Muslim=1, 
otherwise=0)  0.585 0.391  0.606  0.32  0.309  0.281 
    (27.51)** (20.49)**  (26.75)**  (3.88)** (2.78)** (3.39)**
  Mother`s Literacy  -0.052 -0.497  -  -0.354  -2.389  - 
  (whether mother literate)  (3.08)** (4.23)**  -  (8.11)**  (2.46)*  - 
  Father`s Literacy  0.033 -0.164  -  -0.053  1.658  - 
    (2.12)* (1.27)  -  (1.18)  (1.33)  - 
  Mother`s Wage  - -  -9.16  - - - 
    - -  (2.76)**  - - - 
  Father`s Wage  - -  -11.9  - - - 
    - -  (6.66)**  - - - 
 
Whether mother is literate, but 
has not completed primary school  - -  -0.086  - -  -0.147 
    - -  (3.46)**  - -  (2.92)**
 
Whether mother completed 
primary school  - -  -0.08  - -  -0.484 
    - -  (3.21)**  - -  (8.83)**
 
Whether mother completed 
middle school  - -  -0.116  - -  -1.146 
    - -  (2.48)*  - -  (10.28)**
 
Whether mother completed 
secondary or higher secondary 
school 
- -  -0.132  - - - 
    - -  (1.06)  - - - 
 
Whether mother completed higher 
education  - -  -0.29  - - - 
    - -  (1.54)  - - - 26 
 
 
Whether father is literate, but has 
not completed primary school  - -  0.076  - - - 
    - -  (3.38)**  - - - 
 
Whether father completed primary 
school  - -  0.122  - -  -0.01 
    - -  (4.90)**  - -  (0.20) 
 
Whether father completed middle 
school  - -  0.21  - -  -0.123 
    - -  (6.34)**  - -  (2.30)* 
 
Whether father completed 
secondary or higher secondary 
school 
- -  0.349  - -  -0.306 
    - -  (5.50)**  - -  (3.66)**
 
Whether father completed higher 
education  - -  0.619  - - - 
    - -  (5.37)**  - - - 
 
rural sector dummy (rural=1 
urban=0)  0.016  -0.062  -0.162  0.163 -0.07 0.053 
    (0.94) (3.71)**  (6.06)**  (2.99)**  (0.77)  (0.96) 
  Son`s Preference Index  0.28  0.226  0.273  1.971 1.255 1.963 
    (48.91)** (41.34)**  (47.27)**  (48.45)** (35.32)** (48.36)**
  Number of Adults  -0.153  -0.089  -0.163  0.051 0.062 0.056 
    (32.67)** (27.66)**  (30.47)**  (5.41)** (4.29)** (5.90)**
  Constant  -5.897  -1.366  -7.355  -7.58 -3.53 -7.43 
    (60.05)  (12.94)  (69.33)  (29.29) (8.04) (28.78)
   Observations  92399  83789  79112  11726 11585 11663 
  R-squared  - 0.31  -  -  0.38  - 
 
Joint Significant Test 















   =26569**    =22362** =11670**    =11768**
 
Coefficient estimates and z 
statistics of instruments in the 
first stage 
(1)  For Mother’s Literacy 
         
  the availability of education for 
grandmothers  - 0.239  -  -  0.050  - 
     (36.62)**      (0.99)   
  the availability of  education for 
grandfathers  - 0.201  -  -  0.453  - 
     (41.54)**      (17.07)**   
             
  (2)  For Father’s Literacy          
  the availability of education for 
grandmothers  - 0.009  -  -  -0.139  - 
     (1.39)      (2.66)**   
  the availability of education for 
grandfathers  - 0.213  -  -  0.381  - 
     (43.10)**      (13.80)**   



















Notes  1. Robust ｚt statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 









Table 4 Determinants of Fertility (based on NSS 55
th round in 1999/2000 and NFHS-2 in 1998/9) 
Dependent Variable: Number of Children 
    Based on NSS 55 (1999/2000)  Based on NFHS-2 (1998/9) 
    Case (1)  Case (2)  Case (3) Case (1) Case (2)  Case (3) 
   
 












    Coef.   Coef.   Coef.   Coef.   Coef.   Coef.  
Explanatory Variables  (t value)  (t value)  (t value)  (t value)  (t value)  (t value) 
  Mother`s Age  0.522 0.202  0.231  0.263  0.089  0.273 
    (69.14)** (56.95)**  (56.07)** (28.27)** (4.45)** (29.78)**
  (Mother`s Age)
2  -0.008 -0.003  -0.004  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
    (76.07)** (74.02)**  (68.82)** (8.87)** (2.07)* (10.29)**
  Scheduled Tribe (ST) dummy 
(ST=1, otherwise=0)  -0.006 -0.074  0.137  0.067  0.218  0.028 
    (0.18) (2.92)**  (5.47)** (1.57)  (1.00)  (0.66) 
  Scheduled Caste (SC) dummy 
(SC=1, otherwise=0)  0.051 -0.039  0.143  0.289  0.288  0.207 
    (2.21)* (1.92)  (7.69)** (9.52)** (1.70)  (6.85)** 
 
non-agricultural self employment 
dummy (non-agricultural self 
employment=1 otherwise) 
0.177 0.133  0.076  0.018  -0.047  0.003 
    (9.59)** (9.72)** (1.93)  (0.63)  (0.58) (0.12) 
 
agricultural self employment 
dummy (agricultural self 
employment=1 otherwise=0) 
0.18 0.069  0.015  0.093  0.309  0.024 
    (6.01)** (3.50)** (0.48)  (3.47)** (1.67) (0.88) 
  monthly per capita expenditure 
(MPCE) (Rs.) (/10
6)  -1,263.80 -466.85  -  -  -  - 
    (24.18)** (10.63)**  -  -  -  - 
  Land Owned  -0.002 -0.001  -0.002  -0.005  -0.004  -0.004 
    (3.23)** (5.15)**  (7.01)** (2.05)*  (1.14) (1.91) 
  Muslim dummy(Muslim=1, 
otherwise=0)  0.699 0.452  0.495  0.482  0.638  0.355 
    (26.55)** (20.83)**  (20.98)** (11.48)** (2.85)** (8.47)** 
  Mother`s Literacy  -0.247 -0.384  -  -0.452  -4.746  - 
  (whether mother literate)  (11.46)** (2.65)**  -  (17.18)** (3.15)**  - 
  Father`s Literacy  -0.007 -0.317  -  -0.077  5.952  - 
  (whether father literate)  (0.31) (2.07)*  -  (2.50)*  (2.24)*  - 
  Mother`s Wage  - -  -6.63  - -  - 
    - -  (7.77)** - -  - 
  Father`s Wage  - -  4.28  - -  - 
    - -  (3.83)** - -  - 
 
Whether mother is literate, but 
has not completed primary 
school 
- -  -0.162  - -  -0.121 
    - -  (7.19)** - -  (3.82)** 
  Whether mother completed 
primary school  - -  -0.246  - -  -0.428 
    - -  (10.30)** - -  (13.75)**
  Whether mother completed 
middle school  - -  -0.351  - -  -1.088 
    - -  (14.05)** - -  (26.72)**
 
Whether mother completed 
secondary or higher 
secondary school 
- -  -0.283  - -  - 
    - -  (11.54)** - -  - 
  Whether mother completed 
higher education  - -  -0.229  - -  - 
    - -  (4.63)** - -  - 
 
Whether father is literate, but 
has not completed primary 
school 
- -  0.016  - -  0.043 
    - -  (0.73)  - -  (1.21) 
  Whether father completed 
primary school  - -  -0.036  - -  -0.094 
    - -  (1.70)  - -  (2.83)** 
  Whether father completed 
middle school  - -  -0.074  - -  -0.252 
    - -  (3.51)** - -  (6.24)** 
 
Whether father completed 
secondary or higher 
secondary school 
- -  -0.16  - -  - 
    - -  (6.82)** - -  - 
  Whether father completed 
higher education  - -  -0.253  - -  - 
    - -  (7.42)** - -  - 28 
 
  rural sector dummy (rural=1 
urban=0)  -0.043 -0.053  0.477  0.31  -0.001  0.154 
    (2.01)* (2.97)**  (9.28)** (11.94)** 0.00    (5.85)** 
  Son`s Preference Index  0.314 0.248  0.248  1.669  1.013  1.671 
    (36.07)** (31.66)**  (31.36)** (68.12)** (23.71)** (68.91)**
  Number of Adults  -0.158 -0.111  -0.111  0.086  0.049  0.089 
    (27.06)** (31.21)**  (32.38)** (13.91)** (1.43) (14.56)**
  Constant  -5.87 -0.747  -2.409  -6.44  -3.80  -6.41 
    (43.50) (9.28)  (21.15) (40.70) (4.29)  (41.27) 
   Observations  59869 56927  52971  26955  26955  26872 
  R-squared   0.36  0.34  -  -  - 
 























Coefficient estimates and 
z statistics of instruments 
in the first stage 
(3) For  Mother’s 
Literacy 
         
  the availability of education 
for grandmothers  - 0.177  -  -  -0.107  - 
     (20.92)**      (1.93)   
  the availability of education 
for grandfathers  - 0.197  -  -  0.421  - 
     (29.51)**      (10.10)**   
              
  (4) For  Father’s 
Literacy            
  the availability of education 
for grandmothers  - 0.008  -  -  -0.195  - 
     (1.01)      (3.80)   
  the availability of education 
for grandfathers  - 0.262  -  -  0.262  - 
     (42.21)**      (7.53)**   




















Notes  1. Robust ｚt statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
























Table 5 Determinants of Fertility (based on NSS 61
st round in 2004/5 and NFHS-3 in 2005/6) 
Dependent Variable: Number of Children 
    Based on NSS 61 (2004/2005)  Based on NFHS-3 (2005/2006) 
    Case (1)  Case (2)  Case (3)  Case (1)  Case (2)  Case (3) 












    Coef.   Coef.   Coef.   Coef.   Coef.   Coef.  
Explanatory Variables  (t value)  (t value)  (t value)  (t value)  (t value)  (t value) 
  Mother`s Age  -0.006 0.121  0.15  0.55  0.068  0.362 
    (1.23) (47.16)** (50.13)** (78.52)** (4.81)** (50.72)** 
  (Mother`s Age)
2  0.00 -0.002  -0.002  -0.006  -0.001  -0.003 
    (4.75)** (66.34)** (64.63)** (56.50)** (3.00)** (31.42)** 
 
Scheduled Tribe (ST) 
dummy (ST=1, otherwise=0) 0.023 0.00 0.106  0.114  0.09  0.22 
    (1.00) (0.02)  (7.07)**  (2.93)**  (1.74)  (5.72)** 
 
Scheduled Caste (SC) 
dummy (SC=1, otherwise=0) 0.111 0.054 0.051  0.241  0.077  0.204 






0.185 0.087 0.037  0.193  0.173  -0.027 
    (12.91)** (9.44)**  (1.64)  (9.74)**  (4.71)**  (1.45) 
 
agricultural self employment 
dummy (agricultural self 
employment=1 otherwise=0)
0.145 0.026 -0.044  -  -  - 
    (8.51)** (2.49)* (2.00)*  -  -  - 
 
monthly per capita 
expenditure (MPCE) (Rs.) 
(/10
6) 
-0.033 -0.011  -  - -  - 
    (2.63)** (4.80)**  -  - -  - 
  Land Owned  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.019 0  0.024 
    (0.90) (0.83)  (14.07)** (10.11)** (0.02) (9.03)** 
 
Muslim dummy(Muslim=1, 
otherwise=0)  0.595 0.378 0.336  0.479 0.159 0.476 
    (27.73)** (24.08)** (20.50)** (13.63)** (3.45)** (13.54)** 
  Mother`s Literacy  -0.383 -0.344  -  -0.902  -5.31  - 
  (whether mother literate)  (24.65)** (3.90)**  -  (46.14)** (7.91)**  - 
  Father`s Literacy  -0.133 -0.296  -  -0.288  5.764  - 
  (whether father literate)  (7.60)** (2.85)**  -  (9.16)**  (5.44)**  - 
  Mother`s Wage  - -  -2.36  - -  - 
    - -  (16.28)** - -  - 
  Father`s Wage  - -  0.74  - -  - 
    - -  (8.13)**  - -  - 
 
Whether mother is literate, 
but has not completed 
primary school 
- -  -0.094  - -  -0.217 
    - -  (6.74)**  - -  (7.37)** 
 
Whether mother completed 
primary school  - -  -0.079  - -  -0.656 
    - -  (5.91)**  - -  (29.12)** 
 
Whether mother completed 
middle school  - -  -0.145  - -  -1.171 
    - -  (8.83)**  - -  (42.26)** 
 
Whether mother completed 
secondary or higher 
secondary school 
- -  -0.037  - -  - 
    - -  (2.50)*  - -  - 
 
Whether mother completed 
higher education  - -  -0.233  - -  - 
    - -  (11.02)** - -  - 
  Whether father is literate,  - -  -0.253  - -  -0.013 30 
 
but has not completed 
primary school 
    - -  (16.79)** - -  (0.40) 
 
Whether father completed 
primary school  - -  -0.188  - -  -0.056 
    - -  (13.82)** - -  (1.86) 
 
Whether father completed 
middle school  - -  -0.202  - -  -0.355 
    - -  (11.97)** - -  (9.24)** 
 
Whether father completed 
secondary or higher 
secondary school 
- -  -0.163  - -  - 
    - -  (10.98)** - -  - 
 
Whether father completed 
higher education  - -  -0.003  - -  - 
    - -  (0.10)  - -  - 
 
rural sector dummy (rural=1 
urban=0)  0.172 0.004 0.496  0.301  -0.035  0.11 
    (11.49)** (0.32) (16.42)** (14.17)** (0.98)  (5.24)** 
  Son`s Preference Index  1.961 1.397 1.385  1.222  0.687  1.096 
    (114.54)** (116.29)** (111.21)** (73.40)** (24.37)**  (64.02)** 
  Number of Adults  0.07 -0.114  -0.124  0.08  0.137  0.153 
    (14.78)** (37.25)** (44.79)** (13.70)** (15.45)** (24.08)** 
  Constant  0.701 -0.149 -1.585  -11.05  -3.08  -7.73 
    (7.65) (2.43)  (20.04)  (-79.21) (-8.07) (-57.07) 
  Observations  91666 91666 82390  47441  47341  35376 
   R-squared  - 0.45  0.45  -  -  - 





















Coefficient estimates and z 
statistics of instruments in 
the first stage 
(1) For  Mother’s 
Literacy 
          
the availability of education 
for grandmothers  - 0.208  -  -  0.128  - 
   (31.63)**      (10.50)**   
the availability of education 
for grandfathers  - 0.169  -  -  0.349  - 
   (34.85)**      (32.53)**   
            
(2) For  Father’s 
Literacy            
the availability of education 
for grandmothers  - 0.037  -  -  0.014  - 
   (6.21)**      (1.64)   
the availability of education 
for grandfathers  - 0.226  -  -  0.265  - 
   (50.74)**      (34.40)**   






















 Notes  1. Robust ｚt statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 




Appendix 1 Wage Equations for male and female workers based on NSS data in 1993, 1998, and 2004 
(Rural Areas) 
  1993   1998   2004  













  Coef.   Coef.   Coef.   Coef.   Coef.   Coef.  
   (t value)  (t value)  (t value)  (t value)  (t value)  (t value) 
Land Owned  0.349  -0.324  -0.452  -0.386  0.00  -0.082 
 (0.98)  (4.86)**  (5.89)**  (2.75)**  (2.39)*  (8.35)** 
Scheduled Tribe (ST) dummy (ST=1, otherwise=0)  -322.569  1,018.14  -27.535  -148.539  -121.41  -108.96 
 (0.87)  (4.08)**  (2.32)*  (13.75)**  (9.13)**  (7.53)** 
Scheduled Caste (SC) dummy (SC=1, otherwise=0)  -2,177.57 -381.166  -18.872  -77.975  -  - 
 (7.95)**  (1.89)  (2.03)*  (8.45)**     
non-agricultural self employment dummy (non-agricultural 
self employment=1 otherwise)  7,216.57 2,324.92  -1,306.23 -460.104  -1,859.26 -566.23 
 (10.27)**  (5.49)**  (52.30)**  (25.18)** (68.44)**  (21.97)** 
agricultural self employment dummy (agricultural self 
employment=1 otherwise=0)  7,899.48 5,204.41  -1,181.15 -579.812  -2,196.08 -880.79 
 (15.13)**  (14.37)**  (53.85)**  (23.35)** (69.07)**  (22.83)** 
Muslim dummy(Muslim=1, otherwise=0)  746.744  185.894  29.163  -210.77  113.494  -330.9 
 (1.61)  (0.46)  (2.18)*  (12.87)**  (5.59)**  (10.79)** 
Age 662.822  204.695  69.715  28.053  139.625  49.933 
 (8.65)**  (3.65)**  (30.66)**  (10.97)** (37.08)**  (10.15)** 
Age
2  -4.072 -1.257  -0.86  -0.359  -1.638 -0.637 
 (4.17)**  (1.69)  (32.63)**  (11.03)** (39.07)**  (10.24)** 
Whether mother (or father) is literate, but has not 
completed primary school  3,542.99 2,126.39  20.675  -98.23  92.081  -205.98 
 (12.71)**  (7.36)**  (1.89)  (7.56)**  (5.10)**  (8.72)** 
Whether mother (or father) completed primary school  7,518.66  3,208.70  70.519  -234.546  175.043  -227.04 
  (23.01)** (7.49)**  (5.94)** (13.56)**  (9.45)**  (9.53)** 
Whether mother (or father) completed middle school  14,163.75 10,200.92  155.273  -197.743  360.514  -192.21 
 (29.57)**  (8.09)**  (12.13)**  (10.15)** (19.49)**  (7.37)** 
Whether mother (or father) completed secondary or 
higher secondary school  35,055.00 38,201.86 532.061  284.545  810.913  201.04 
 (56.87)**  (26.88)**  (36.19)**  (12.11)** (33.86)**  (5.63)** 
Whether mother (or father) completed higher education 57,151.06 53,253.26  1,091.99  736.177  1,473.09  1,004.51 
  (47.65)** (17.32)**  (38.63)** (14.63)** (64.15)**  (20.43)** 
Constant -2,171.00 4,216.78  -1,366.54 -954.455  -2,940.20 -1,749.97 
 (1.50)  (4.18)**  (27.84)**  (17.48)** (34.97)**  (16.65)** 
Observations  33720  15849  64631  62488  67168  59221 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses             
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level             32 
 
(Urban Areas) 
  1993   1998   2004  












  Coef.   Coef.   Coef.   Coef.   Coef.   Coef.  
   (t value)  (t value)  (t value)  (t value)  (t value)  (t value) 
Land  Owned  -3.614  15.997  0.075 -0.653  0.001 -0.077 
 (1.21).  (1.94).  (0.48).  (2.90)**  (1.32).  (2.36)* 
Scheduled Tribe (ST) dummy (ST=1, otherwise=0)  -2,611.33 4,112.63  -78.439  -703.703  -55.486  -634.305 
 (2.53)*  (3.59)**  (3.09)**  (14.20)**  (2.08)*  (11.26)** 
Scheduled Caste (SC) dummy (SC=1, otherwise=0)  -4,698.31 -561.604  -17.674  -439.395     
 (8.11)**  (0.83).  (1.02).  (11.33)**     
non-agricultural self employment dummy (non-agricultural 
self employment=1 otherwise)  21,496.64 6,469.18 -2,584.54 -1,122.31 -3,658.11 -1,401.75 
 (9.98)**  (5.82)**  (62.16)**  (23.35)** (44.47)**  (22.58)** 
          
Muslim dummy(Muslim=1, otherwise=0)  -4,223.52 149.138  -85.447  -420.463  -37.205  -523.604 
  (6.55)**  (0.14). (4.56)**  (8.31)** (0.99).  (5.76)** 
Age 1,324.95  1,030.76  189.38  113.16  315.387  212.348 
 (6.99)**  (4.52)**  (49.12)**  (10.95)** (28.86)**  (10.41)** 
Age
2  -4.568 -6.226  -2.267 -1.262  -3.74  -2.49 
 (1.80).  (2.10)*  (49.03)**  (10.03)** (29.58)**  (10.00)** 
Whether mother (or father) is literate, but has not 
completed primary school  4,798.27 5,090.88  110.174 -218.989  173.623 -430.541 
  (7.49)** (3.58)**  (4.77)** (4.49)**  (3.81)** (4.71)** 
Whether mother (or father) completed primary school  6,855.26  6,064.43  115.636  -530.84  243.726  -595.215 
  (10.65)**  (7.23)**  (5.36)** (9.73)**  (5.86)** (7.01)** 
Whether mother (or father) completed middle school  12,945.26 15,461.91  267.889  -574.963  429.975  -854.305 
 (20.70)**  (10.05)**  (13.16)**  (10.59)** (11.35)**  (9.67)** 
Whether mother (or father) completed secondary or 
higher secondary school  29,461.08 37,408.31 497.771  295.871  737.639  -231.205 
 (46.56)**  (35.46)**  (25.91)**  (8.10)** (18.08)**  (2.51)* 
Whether mother (or father) completed higher education 61,317.93 56,576.27  1,091.78  1,300.66  1,644.48  1,539.72 
  (63.86)** (39.31)**  (45.37)** (21.14)** (41.56)**  (21.16)** 
Constant -14,176.68 -13,738.35 -3,524.42 -4,121.62  -6,186.53 -6,791.28 
 (4.21)**  (3.25)**  (43.42)**  (16.21)** (26.69)**  (15.95)** 
Observations  23968  5934  44205 39700  28367 24174 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses             





Appendix 2 State-wise estimates of determinants of Fertility (based on NSS in 1993/4, 1999/2000, and 2004/5) 
Dependent Variable: Proxied Fertility (Number of Unmarried Children under 15 years old of household head (Based on Robust Standard Errors) 
  Andhra Pradesh  Tamil Nadu  Kerala 
  1993 1998 2004  1993 1998 2004  1993  1999  2004 
  Coef.   Coef.   Coef.   Coef.   Coef.   Coef.   Coef.   Coef.  Coef.  
   (t value) (t value) (t value)   (t value)  (t value) (t value)   (t value) (t 
value) (t value)
Mother`s  Age  0.539 0.542 -0.08  0.588 0.447  -0.047  0.451 0.3  -0.31 
 (22.43)** (14.90)** (3.99)** (21.91)**  (8.99)** (2.19)* (10.82)** (4.36)** (9.81)**
(Mother`s Age)
2 -0.009  -0.009  0.001  -0.009  -0.008  0  -0.007  -0.005 0.003 
 (24.07)** (16.33)** (2.26)*  (23.14)**  (10.33)** (0.02) (12.38)** (5.89)** (8.38)**
Scheduled Tribe (ST) dummy (ST=1, otherwise=0)  0.097  0.342  0.191  -0.06  -0.645  0.21  -0.361  0.11  -0.416 
 (0.94)  (2.17)*  (2.01)*  (0.31)  (1.64)  (0.58)  (0.95)  (0.39) (1.38) 
Scheduled Caste (SC) dummy (SC=1, otherwise=0)  -0.03  0.186  0.053  0.03  0.217  -0.042  -0.012  0.694  0.482 
 (0.49)  (1.97)*  (0.51)  (0.50)  (1.77)  (0.12)  (0.12)  (3.03)** (1.55) 
non-agricultural self employment dummy (non-agricultural self 
employment=1 otherwise)  0.193 0.008  0.5  0.188 0.228  -0.091  0.037  0.616  -0.372 
 (2.09)*  (0.03)  (3.37)** (2.15)*  (0.90)  (0.62)  (0.34)  (1.90) (2.22)* 
agricultural self employment dummy (agricultural self 
employment=1 otherwise=0)  0.141 0.2 0.575  0.343  0.267  0.035  -0.067  0.615  -0.236 
 (1.57)  (1.11)  (3.76)** (3.61)**  (1.25)  (0.24)  (0.53)  (2.25)* (1.31) 
Mother`s Wage  0.00001 -0.00025 -0.001  0.000025  -0.0001 -0.0003 0.0002  -0.0004 0.0001 
  (1.12)  (1.33) (4.38)** (3.07)** (0.53) (2.90)** (1.39) (1.35) (0.87) 
Father`s Wage  -0.00001 0.00001 0.0003  0.00001  0.00008 0.00003 -0.00001 0.003  -0.0002
 (1.30)  (0.58)  (3.61)** (2.88)**  (0.53)  (0.47)  (1.23)  (2.56)* (2.44)* 
Land  Owned  -0.004 -0.008 -0.001  -0.006 -0.006 -0.001  -0.006  -0.006 -0.002 
 (4.38)** (7.10)** (9.83)** (5.62)**  (3.86)** (5.37)** (2.45)*  (1.90) (3.88)**
Muslim dummy(Muslim=1, otherwise=0)  0.391  0.811  0.329  0.514  0.573  0.098  0.745  0.677  0.837 
 (4.85)** (7.07)** (3.18)** (5.44)**  (3.76)** (0.71)  (8.80)** (4.37)** (8.74)**
Whether mother is literate, but has not completed primary 
school  -0.326 -0.501 -0.338  -0.123 -0.066 -0.138  -0.136  -0.159 -0.129 
 (3.76)** (4.42)** (3.57)** (1.57)  (0.46)  (1.55)  (0.89)  (0.55) (0.76) 
Whether mother completed primary school  -0.261  -0.337  -0.424  -0.118  -0.04  -0.126  -0.313  -0.724 -0.314 
 (2.88)** (2.71)** (4.73)** (1.59)  (0.28)  (1.60)  (2.11)*  (2.63)** (2.08)* 
Whether mother completed middle school  -0.338  -0.405  -0.459  -0.404  -0.097  -0.359  -0.322  -0.427 -0.274 
 (1.95)  (3.02)** (4.42)** (3.10)**  (0.64)  (3.89)** (1.40)  (1.61) (1.80) 
Whether mother completed secondary or higher secondary 
school  -0.695 -0.124 -0.226  -1.216 -0.075 -0.212  -0.842 0.082 -0.144 
  (1.59)  (0.96) (2.18)*  (3.92)** (0.50) (2.04)*  (1.37) (0.30) (0.88) 
Whether mother completed higher education  -1.205  0.143  0.411  -1.883  -0.076  0.155  -1.171  0.458  -0.286 
 (1.85)  (0.49)  (1.97)*  (3.99)**  (0.23)  (0.92)  (1.29)  (1.09) (1.25) 
Whether father is literate, but has not completed primary 
school  -0.13  0.185 -0.125  0.199 -0.098 0.014  0.038  -0.259 -0.179 
  (1.83) (1.70) (1.54)  (2.60)**  (0.65) (0.16)  (0.24)  (0.87) (1.13) 34 
 
Whether father completed primary school  -0.11  -0.196  -0.126  0.245  -0.074  -0.004  -0.147  -0.159 -0.224 
  (1.27) (1.94) (1.70)  (3.30)**  (0.53) (0.05)  (0.96)  (0.57) (1.50) 
Whether father completed middle school  -0.098  -0.056  -0.388  0.301  0.003  0.062  -0.249  -0.347 -0.186 
 (0.86)  (0.50)  (4.58)** (3.15)**  (0.02)  (0.70)  (1.40)  (1.24) (1.25) 
Whether father completed secondary or higher secondary 
school  -0.089 -0.363 -0.414  0.532  -0.131 -0.025  -0.115  -0.704 -0.34 
 (0.43)  (2.84)** (3.84)** (3.21)**  (0.78)  (0.24)  (0.38)  (2.30)* (1.91) 
Whether father completed higher education  -0.039  -0.622  -0.702  0.728  -0.193  -0.089  0.179  -1.271z -0.004 
 (0.10)  (2.94)** (4.72)** (2.37)*  (0.78)  (0.64)  (0.35)  (3.02)** (0.02) 
rural sector dummy (rural=1 urban=0)  -0.117  0.452  0.942  0.05  0.282  0.604  0.206  0.673  0.042 
  (1.43)  (1.43) (3.71)** (0.65)  (0.78) (3.09)** (1.78) (1.45) (0.17) 
Son`s Preference Index  0.3  0.312  1.819  0.271  0.332  1.732  0.203  0.344  1.769 
 (15.84)** (8.70)** (29.71)** (12.68)**  (8.20)** (27.88)** (7.34)** (5.94)** (21.15)**
Number of Adults  -0.136  -0.075  0.131  -0.153  -0.21  -0.003  -0.234  -0.204 0.097 
 (6.36)** (2.72)** (5.50)** (7.63)**  (6.14)** (0.14)  (7.62)** (5.06)** (3.46)**
Constant -6.191  -6.789  0.761  -7.329  -4.962  1.36  -4.453  -2.783 7.443 
 (16.79)** (9.64)** (1.52)  (17.44)**  (5.17)** (2.72)** (6.25)** (1.86) (9.72)**
Observations  6507 4598 5315    5527 2498 4514    2528  1185  3019 
Robust z statistics in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
                  
 West  Bengal    Orissa  Bihar 
 1993  1998  2004    1993 1998 2004  1993 1998 2004 
  Coef.   Coef.   Coef.     Coef.   Coef.   Coef.   Coef.   Coef.   Coef.  
   (t value) (t value) (t value)    (t value) (t value) (t value)   (t value) (t value) (t value)
Mother`s Age  0.666  0.654  0.161    0.61 0.543  0.022  0.617 0.633 0.146 
 (39.09)** (27.99)** (8.47)**   (18.29)** (13.47)** (0.92)  (30.36)** (23.66)** (7.24)**
(Mother`s Age)
2 -0.01  -0.009  -0.002    -0.009 -0.008  0  -0.009 -0.009 -0.002 
 (40.62)** (29.77)** (8.79)**   (19.27)** (14.55)** (1.58)  (31.09)** (24.71)** (7.18)**
Scheduled Tribe (ST) dummy (ST=1, otherwise=0)  0.271  0.086  -0.443    0.002 0.373 0.277  0.138 0.175 -0.279 
 (1.33)  (0.35)  (2.01)*    (0.02) (3.05)** (3.52)** (1.45) (1.38)  (3.18)**
Scheduled Caste (SC) dummy (SC=1, otherwise=0)  -0.123  0.25  0.612    -0.1 0.361  -0.172  0.088 0.18 0.367 
 (2.29)*  (3.25)** (2.75)**   (1.09) (3.36)** (1.94)  (1.34) (1.99)*  (3.75)**
non-agricultural self employment dummy (non-agricultural self 
employment=1 otherwise)  0.525 0.483 0.559    0.219 0.339 (0.85)  0.445 0.469 0.753 
 (6.27)** (2.35)*  (3.64)**   (1.82) (1.33) 0.181  (4.41)** (2.20)* (4.60)**
agricultural self employment dummy (agricultural self 
employment=1 otherwise=0)  0.5 0.318  0.588    0.343 0.27 0.135  0.422 0.161 0.581 
 (6.70)** (1.68)  (3.80)**   (2.86)** (1.35) (0.63)  (4.77)** (0.96) (3.44)**
Mother`s Wage  0.000016 -0.00004 -0.008    -0.0001 -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.00001 -0.001 -0.0008
 (1.31)  (2.18)*  (7.16)**   (0.09) (2.70)** (3.37)** (0.39) (4.71)** (6.32)**
Father`s Wage  0.00002 0.0003  0.0004    -0.0001 0.0003 0.0002  -0.00001 0.0005 0.0004 
 (3.90)** (1.66)  (5.19)**   (1.07) (1.76) (1.41)  (1.82) (3.18)** (5.10)**35 
 
Land Owned  -0.01  -0.01  -0.002    -0.007 -0.006 -0.001  -0.006 -0.011 -0.001 
 (9.04)** (2.46)*  (9.25)**   (4.01)** (3.18)** (7.96)** (5.34)** (6.58)** (10.46)**
Muslim dummy(Muslim=1, otherwise=0)  0.589  0.723  0.135    0.981 1.067 0.837  0.751 0.601 -0.009 
 (10.25)** (7.78)** (1.66)    (3.85)** (4.04)** (2.58)** (10.66)** (5.35)** (0.10) 
Whether mother is literate, but has not completed primary 
school  -0.156 -0.372 -0.537    0.061 -0.221  -0.319  -0.011 -0.121 -0.459 
 (1.60)  (2.94)** (4.62)**   (0.54) (1.89)  (3.44)** (0.10) (0.94)  (4.51)**
Whether mother completed primary school  -0.101  -0.531  -0.581    -0.073 -0.069 -0.293  0.124 -0.313 -0.589 
 (1.06)  (4.44)** (6.77)**   (0.48) (0.44)  (2.54)*  (0.87) (1.90)  (5.32)**
Whether mother completed middle school  -0.356  -0.668  -0.807    -0.004 -0.434 -0.42  0.013 -0.464 -0.707 
 (1.95)  (5.19)** (8.34)**   (0.02) (2.73)** (3.67)** (0.07) (2.78)** (6.33)**
Whether mother completed secondary or higher secondary 
school  -1.182 -0.532 -0.863    -0.204 -0.072 -0.225  0.018 -0.162 -0.512 
 (2.56)*  (4.44)** (7.69)**   (0.28) (0.42) (1.49)  (0.04) (1.06)  (4.30)**
Whether mother completed higher education  -1.96  -0.531  0.246    -0.341 -0.141 0.853  -0.664 0.35 0.119 
 (2.89)** (1.94)  (1.40)    (0.32) (0.41)  (3.23)** (0.91) (1.13) (0.54) 
Whether father is literate, but has not completed primary 
school  0.173 -0.051  -0.246    0.186 0.136 0.131  0.277 0.116 0.091 
 (2.35)*  (0.51)  (2.54)*    (1.96) (1.20) (1.46)  (3.24)** (1.21) (1.04) 
Whether father completed primary school  0.245  0.012  -0.253    0.266 -0.14 0.04  0.364 -0.076 -0.164 
 (3.03)** (0.13)  (3.53)**   (1.93) (0.90) (0.41)  (3.47)** (0.63) (1.85) 
Whether father completed middle school  0.515  0.021  -0.339    0.46 -0.096  -0.236  0.488 -0.108 -0.108 
 (4.71)** (0.24)  (4.70)**   (2.75)** (0.73) (2.33)*  (3.94)** (1.03) (1.26) 
Whether father completed secondary or higher secondary 
school  0.867 -0.234 -0.61    0.416 -0.213  -0.324  0.684 -0.338 -0.123 
 (3.86)** (2.11)*  (6.09)**   (1.24) (1.29)  (2.04)*  (2.69)** (2.55)* (1.12) 
Whether father completed higher education  1.534  -0.535  -0.992    0.365 -0.266 -0.64  1.083 -0.905 -0.622 
 (3.75)** (2.84)** (7.20)**   (0.61) (0.98)  (2.77)** (2.37)* (3.95)** (3.79)**
rural sector dummy (rural=1 urban=0)  -0.214  0.894  1.71    0.039 1.035 1.047  -0.187 1.592  1.6 
 (2.54)*  (3.08)** (8.01)**   (0.26) (2.85)** (3.50)** (1.65) (4.98)** (6.59)**
Son`s Preference Index  0.226  0.326  1.904    0.284 0.39 1.856  0.239 0.273 1.956 
 (13.11)** (11.00)** (29.57)**   (10.48)** (11.75)** (24.89)** (11.47)** (9.79)** (28.08)**
Number of Adults  -0.125  -0.124  0.104    -0.129 -0.139 0.041  -0.171 -0.161 0.115 
 (10.90)** (8.34)** (6.74)**   (5.56)** (5.46)** (2.04)*  (10.08)** (7.97)** (6.35)**
Constant -8.343  -9.551  -3.668    -7.63 -8.148  -0.814  -7.863 -10.212 -3.743 
 (28.61)** (16.35)** (7.65)**   (13.56)** (9.77)** (1.32)  (22.21)** (16.31)** (7.31)**
Observations 9337  6685  9157     3055 2088 3574    6705 4837 6809 
Robust z statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 